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Abstract:  The international trade in goods and services is dominated by multi-market 
firms. A firm‟s decision to sell in the domestic market vis-à-vis the foreign market 
depends on a number of factors including transport costs, price uncertainties and the 
barriers to trade. We study the effect of a reduction in non-tariff barriers or quotas on the 
optimal decision of firms to allocate output between the domestic market and the foreign 
market. We offer a theoretical analysis on how the firms reallocate sales between 
multiple markets when the exogenous barriers are lifted. We find that the theoretical 
conjecture might get valid support from the evolving pattern of exports by a large number 
of textile and apparel manufacturing firms originating in India. Principally, we obtain a 
condition under which the choice of the firm to operate in multiple markets depends on 
the relative strengths of how profit at the margin reacts to price uncertainty in one of the 
markets as compared to the effect of the sales in one market on the price of another. It 
seems that the withdrawal of the quota since 2005 has led to a greater focus on the 
domestic market for Indian firms and within the country there has also been an increased 
concentration of firms. We used the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index to measure if the Indian 
firms have become more concentrated in terms of sales during the previous two decades. 
The concentration of firms has unambiguously increased in the last two years.          
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1. Introduction 
A firm‟s decision to operate and sell its output in multiple markets is driven by 
many factors. For example, transport costs, which sometimes accounts for 15 to 20% of 
the total cost of production, significantly influences decision to operate in more than one 
market. Exposure to randomness in commodity prices could be an even stronger factor, in 
particular, when coupled with uncertainty about regulatory policies. A comparison of 
transaction costs in different markets can also sufficiently alter a firm‟s decision to 
diversify sales across markets. A well-known result due to Katz and Paroush (1979) 
however, showed that for firms operating in multiple markets, total output would not be 
affected even if price is uncertain in several markets, if at least one market displays price 
certainty. This „separation‟ result holds primarily with respect to choice of output and 
allocation of sales across markets by a typical firm. Dalal and Katz (2003) later showed 
that when transport costs are introduced in this framework, the separation result continues 
to hold, such that the certainty of commodity prices in the domestic market determines 
total output regardless of the price uncertainty and other exogenous parameters in the 
foreign market. They also discuss conditions when the separation condition is violated. 
We discuss more on this in section 2, in relation to our main findings.  
The present paper deals with the multi-market choice of a competitive firm that 
faces an export quota and uncertain price in the foreign market, whereas a certain price 
and a competitive product market domestically. We model the sales allocation of such a 
firm, first in the presence of a quota and subsequently when the quota is withdrawn. The 
problem is interesting in the following sense. During the regime of quota restricted export 
the firm enjoys a certain market for its output (foreign sales), even though the quota 
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might have been set at an inefficient level. We assume that even with a quota the foreign 
price is uncertain because there is no guarantee that quotas are fulfilled. On the other 
hand, the domestic price is certain and the firm sells at the level where price equals 
marginal cost. Subsequently, when the quota is withdrawn the firm might lose its captive 
market to competition from others – with a possibility that the foreign price falls. The 
profit maximizing reallocation of sales should then factor in the changes in the erstwhile 
captive market and readjust the domestic sales with significant price effects. Unless the 
domestic price becomes random owing to this regime shift in the international market, the 
firm continues to produce the same total amount as before owing to the „separation‟ result 
discussed above. As a competing explanation, unless the withdrawal of quota has a 
significant impact on the firm, such that it exports an amount higher than the total output 
it produced previously, it continues to produce the amount where marginal cost equals 
price domestically.  
Alternatively, in case the firms do not find the export market to remain viable any 
longer, it should divert sales to the local market with possible change in prices, ceteris 
paribus. In other words, the loss of foreign market may create excess supply of the good 
in the local market leading to a fall in prices. The production and employment 
implications of such adjustments can be substantial if the industry to which such a firm 
belongs is of critical importance. Indeed, the textile and apparel industry in India 
commands such a position by contributing about 4% of GDP, 14% of industrial 
production, 17% of export revenue, and by employing approximately 25 million workers 
directly and indirectly (Kar, 2012). Furthermore, the various effects of the withdrawal of 
export quota on the Indian manufacturers did not surface instantaneously. Our statistical 
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observations will show that the stronger effects of greater competition show up 
negatively on the export performance and concentration of firms only recently.         
In what ways the firms and the industry as a whole respond to this regime shift in 
policy is an empirical question and we provide evidence from a large number of textile 
and apparel manufacturing firms in India between 1991 and 2013 to show that the firms 
have readjusted sales significantly in the aftermath of the withdrawal of the well-known 
quota system under the aegis of the Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA). In this context, we 
also check for the level of concentration of the firms in terms of sales proceeds over this 
period. The problem discussed in the previous paragraph leads to a brief theoretical 
model that explains such an impact for the general case of sales decision by multi-market 
firms when exposed to trade restrictions, more akin to what is popularly known as the 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) in the related literature (see, Harris, 1985; Krishna 
1988; Yano, 1989; etc).  
In a related context, Kar and Kar (2014) studies issues in firm level concentration 
as well as employment patterns for firms producing and selling textile and apparel. It is 
based on firm level longitudinal data for 15 years encompassing the period over which 
MFA phased out gradually. Relating trade and labor market outcomes, our firm-level 
empirical estimates show that the export-oriented firms in India were not affected 
adversely and that the aggregate wage bill also rose during this period. The firm-level 
panel was supplemented by a state-level panel between 1998 and 2008 to capture the 
region-wise aggregated impact of the withdrawal of MFA on the level of labor earnings 
across regions in India. One of the stark results of this panel (state) fixed effects 
regression is that the aggregate state level wage bill falls as the profit level rises for the 
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industry, implying a more intensive use of capital and technology. The results also 
showed that regional wage disparity has strong relation with regional disparity in firm-
concentration at the level of the industry as measured by the number of factories, as well 
as with regional disparity in sales across the states in India.  
Earlier, Marjit, Kabiraj and Mukherjee (2009) have argued that entry of China in 
the WTO and removal of MFA shall work against the interest of many smaller countries 
in the South.  The scale of production or sheer efficiency of Chinese manufacturers 
would negatively affect the erstwhile quota-protected market shares of a large number of 
countries and might lead to a monopoly outcome. However, as long as the monopoly 
price set by a large exporting country stays below the import competing price in the 
importing countries, gains from trade via removal of quota at destinations still improve. 
Using the constant market share analysis (CMS, see the original formulation in 
Richardson, 1971), Kar and Kar (2011) also showed that the removal of quota led to 
significant changes in country-wise export shares – countries with more efficient 
production techniques captured larger shares of the international market in the post-MFA 
phase. The expected global implications of the withdrawal of MFA had also been studied 
in Trela and Whalley (1990).    
 
1.1 The Multi Fiber Arrangement    
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (henceforth, ATC) ensured the 
dismantling of only quotas on textile and apparel items, while tariff on these items were 
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to stay.1 The Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA) provided a framework under which 
developed countries imposed quotas on exports of textiles and apparel from developing 
countries. These quotas were typically applied on a bilateral basis and were product-
specific as defined by fiber and function. This allowed discrimination not only against 
specific fibers and products but also among exporting countries. The exporting countries‟ 
governments administered the MFA export-quotas, which were allocated to them based 
on predetermined criteria. This iniquitous system of quotas thus violated all the 
fundamental principles of the multilateral trading system, and discriminated against the 
poorest countries and those seeking to move up from reliance on primary commodities to 
manufacturing. 
In other words, despite removal of MFA international trade in clothing and textile 
would still not be entirely free, but only „quota-free‟. In addition, in the presence of 
political equations in an ever more complicated world of multilateral negotiations the 
extent of compliance with ATC on the part of importing countries remains unclear. This 
impending reality brings the issue of competitiveness to the fore for all the exporting 
countries, including India.  In fact, the end of the MFA and the removal of global textile 
quotas on January 1, 2005 have radically changed the global scenario of apparel 
production and trade (Appelbaum, et al. 2005; Gereffi, 2004; UNCTAD, 2005; USITC, 
2004; WTO, 2004, etc.). There was widespread expectation that without the restrictions 
of the quota, large, low-wage countries with well-developed export capacities such as 
China and India would be the prime beneficiaries at the cost of smaller exporting 
countries. Developing countries from across the world with some share of textile and 
                                                 
1
 The Uruguay Round of GATT launched at Punta Del Este led to the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC) in 1995.  It is the institutional shape given to the promise to end quotas in an orderly process within 
ten years divided into three consecutive phases. 
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apparel exports, such as Lesotho in Africa, Bangladesh in Asia and El Salvador in 
Central-South America that had previously benefited from the protection of the quota 
shall lose out. The loss of market would also be associated with high-wage countries like 
the USA, Western Europe and the East Asian “Big Three” (Knappe, 2003; USITC 2004; 
UNCTAD 2005; WTO 2004, etc.).  Statistical support is available for the loss of 
thousands of textile and apparel jobs in the USA and Latin America (Bair and Dussel, 
2006), the growing consolidation among large global buyers (Gereffi, 2005), the 
withdrawal of FDI from the garment industries in some small countries, such as 
Mauritius, Lesotho and Madagascar (Gibbon, 2008), and significant price deflation 
experienced by many apparel exporters worldwide. 
In such a volatile and uncertain environment as countries search for ways to 
compete, the issue of costs, in particular, wage costs have emerged as a central 
consideration in the debate over export competitiveness in the apparel industry. For 
example, in India where labor laws were regarded as relatively „inflexible‟ and therefore 
would render coping with low wage competition difficult, the industry lobby has 
undoubtedly put up a case for dismantling several labor protections. This, according to 
the argument should allow localize small producers to scale-up and subsequently 
compete with countries like Bangladesh, China, and Mexico (Hashim, 2005; Gherzi 
Report, 2003). However, Tewari (2006) questions the view as to whether the cost-
competitiveness, particularly via low wage costs and large scales of operation, is enough 
to achieve sustained export competitiveness in the textile and apparel industry after the 
removal of quotas. It reviews the evidence emerging from a growing body of literature on 
the institutional organization of global trade networks and production chains to argue that 
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in an environment characterized by uncertainty and regulatory flux, and where buyers 
demand many more attributes in addition to price – such as product variety, quality, 
customization and timely delivery – global competitiveness in the apparel industry 
presently requires competency that go well beyond traditional factors of relative price and 
low wages. Indeed, under volatile market conditions and shortened product cycles, large 
scales of operation can add to costs unless they are embedded within other capabilities 
that lower the risk and cost of large volumes (i.e., of rigidity). These capabilities include 
skills, management practices, productive relationships and some promotional activities 
that allow firms to combine speed and scale with more skilled functions such as 
designing, maintaining consistency in quality, keeping low inventories, ensuring timely 
supply, and establishing direct ties with most efficient distribution networks. This should 
arguably offer greater dynamic comparative advantages replacing exclusive dependence 
on low wages. The development of these capabilities varies not only across nations, but 
also among firms and regions within nations. 
Based on these observations, we offer a brief analytical section on how a multi-
market firm allocates sales. We offer some statistical observations on the industry level 
performance in section 3 and conclude in section 4.  
 
2. The Model 
 Consider a firm in a competitive market that produces a single product and sells in 
two markets – domestic (D) and foreign (F). The foreign market in connection with the 
prevalence of MFA as discussed above exercise a quota on how much a country can sell 
as a whole. The firm under consideration is one among a large mass (n) of homogeneous 
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and identical firms in the country and shares the total output as well as the foreign quota 
equally with others. This is denoted by ifq , i = 1…n. If the firm‟s total output is iq , then 
the domestic sale is given by, if
ii
d qqq  , of which ifq  is the amount of the export 
quota facing the firm.2  We assume that the foreign price ( fp~ ) is a random variable, and 
therefore uncertain, while the domestic price ( dp ) is certain. Since fp~ is a random 
variable, it should be noted that for a risk averse firm the higher is the randomness in 
prices the lower is the dependence on such markets where prices are volatile. The cost 
function is convex, such that, qqC )( , where 1 and 0,0  qqq CC . There is also 
a fixed cost of setting up the firm, 0k . We do not focus on the distributional aspects of 
the randomness in foreign price (see Dalal and Katz, 2004 for additive or multiplicative 
distributions). Further, the risk-averse firm maximizes the expected utility of profit under 
two states of nature. First, we will find out the allocation of sales between home and 
foreign markets and second, we will observe how this allocation changes when the 
international market for textile and apparel undergoes a regime shift in policy. In fact, we 
will offer the condition under which the export (as against domestic sale) by the firm 
under consideration may rise or fall. Finally, we will assume that the firm representing a 
developing country enjoys a comparative advantage and exports to a rich country, such 
that, even with changes in international policies there would be no reversals in the 
direction of trade. It should be pointed out that in related problems with a firm deciding 
on a distribution of sales between domestic and foreign markets, it has previously been 
                                                 
2
 If the firms are not identical and vary in terms of size, while being part of a competitive market, the export 
share can be proportional to the size, and the domestic demand facing the firm should also have different 
intercepts. Presently, it should not alter our results. In future extensions we wish to consider a distribution 
of firms on a scale of size and/or risk aversion to cultivate potential differences in the choice problem.     
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shown that depending on the nature of the transport cost function (non-linear) present in 
the domestic market, the separation result alluded to in the beginning fails to hold. In 
particular, introduction of domestic transport cost essentially lowers output, since it shifts 
the marginal cost curve to the left. It is independent of whether the transport cost exists in 
the export market or not (Dalal and Katz, 2003). The non-linearity of the transport cost in 
the domestic market will render the determination of marginal transport cost in the 
domestic market a function of the sales in that market and consequently, the „total output‟ 
shall also depend on foreign parameters. But, the introduction of positive transport costs 
in both markets may still lead to positive sales in both places if the marginal expected 
profits in the foreign market exceed marginal profits in the domestic market. In our case, 
withdrawal of quota does not disrupt the separation condition, but makes the foreign 
profit at the margin a function of the domestic price and its response to foreign sales.   
  Thus, when the regime of quota under the MFA is in place the firm maximizes the 
expected utility of profit with respect to the choice of domestic and foreign sale, of which 
the upper limit of the foreign sale is exogenously fixed. Since selling below the quota is 
inefficient, we will assume that the quota is utilized in full. In fact, Bark and de Melo 
(1989) point out that if approximately 80% of a quota is fulfilled, it is considered to be in 
full use. The expected utility function of the ith firm is given by:  
 )]~([)]([max
,
kqqpqpUEUE ffddqq fd
                (1) 
Here, we must re-emphasize the result due to Katz and Paroush (1979), which shows that 
for a firm operating in a multi-market environment the total quantity produced is 
determined directly by the equality of marginal cost and price, if the price in at least one 
market is certain regardless of uncertainties prevailing in other markets. Using this 
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separation theorem, we obtain the first order condition as: 
0
)]}~([{)]([ 1  



 qp
q
kqqpqpUE
UE
q dd
ffdd
d
  (2) 
where, fd qqq  .  
Second, since it is inefficient to sell less than the quota, 
0
)]}~([{ 1  



q
q
kqqpqpUE
f
ffdd
     (3) 
The second-order conditions (from 2 and 3) offer a negative value for profit 
maximization.  
Thus, from (2)  ** 1
1
qpq di 

         (4) 
The domestic sale of this firm (and all the other identical firms) is given by, 
fd qqq  ** . In other words, this offers a combination of ( fd qq ,* ) as allocation of sales 
in the two markets. This presumes that in the quota-administered regime, the firms 
utilized the full amount of the quota, because not selling the whole amount allocated by 
exogenous reasons would be inefficient.   
 
2.1 Withdrawal of Quota  
Next, suppose that the quota system under the Multi-Fiber Arrangement is 
withdrawn following a policy change in the WTO. The withdrawal of the quota is 
expected to lower the international price and redirect sales to the domestic market where 
the price may fall due to excess supply. Given that the policy change shall have price 
implications for both the destination and the source countries, it evidently calls for 
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looking at the total change. However, we retain the assumption that even if the domestic 
price falls, the price is still certain and therefore the total output is determined according 
to the previous condition where the firm equates domestic price to the marginal cost in 
order to determine the level of total output. The more pertinent question is however, as to 
how much the firm now allocates between D and F, which is to be decided subject to 
changes in the foreign market price on which one country (and less still, one firm) has 
little or no influence. In other words, )~( ff pq  is the amount that the firm decides to 
allocate to foreign sales following the optimization exercise. Here, we must look at the 
total change in the following way.  Equation (1) is re-written as, 
)])~(~([)]([max
)~(
kqpqpqpUEUE fffddpq ff
     (5) 
Differentiating totally,  
0}])~(~~)~(){([ 1   dkdqqpdqppdpqdqpdpqUE ffffffdddd   
Note that, dk=0.  
Therefore,  
0}])~(~~)~(){([ 1   dqqpdqppdpqdqpdpqUE ffffffdddd   
such that, 
0}])~(
~
)~(
~
)~()~()~(){([)~(
)]([ 1  
ff
f
ff
f
ff
ff
d
d
ff
d
d
ff pdq
dqqp
pdq
pd
pq
pdq
dqp
pdq
dpqUE
pdq
UdE 
 
where, ]1)~([)~(  ff
d
ff pdq
dq
pdq
dq
. 
So, 0)}]1)~((
~
)~(
~
)~()~()~(){([
1  
ff
d
f
ff
f
ff
ff
d
d
ff
d
d pdq
dqqp
pdq
pd
pq
pdq
dqp
pdq
dpqUE   
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or,  0}]~
~
)~(
)~(
)~()()~(){([
11     qp
pd
pdq
pq
pdq
dqqp
pdq
dpqUE f
f
ff
ff
ff
d
d
ff
d
d
 
Rearranging, 
0}]~
)~(
~
~
)~(
~
)~()()~(){([
11     qp
pq
p
pd
pdq
p
pdq
dqqp
pdq
dpqUE f
ff
f
f
ff
f
ff
d
d
ff
d
d
 
Define, )~(
~
~
)~(
ff
f
f
ff
qf pq
p
pd
pdq  as the elasticity of demand facing the firm in the 
foreign market.  
Thus, 0)}])11(~()~()()~(){([
11     qppdq
dqqp
pdq
dpqUE
qf
f
ff
d
d
ff
d
d  (6) 
Further, let ff ppE )~( .  
Since, )()()(),( YEXEXYEYXCov   we can re-write (6), which is of the E(XY) 
form, in the following way.  
0)])11(~()~()()~([)]([]
~),([ 11     qppdq
dqqp
pdq
dpqEUEpUCov
qf
f
ff
d
d
ff
d
df
           (7) 
The first term on the LHS of (7) is negative, because the marginal utility of profit of a 
risk-averse firm shall go down if the randomness in price rises. In other words, 
0]~),([  fpUCov  . 
Re-organizing (7) 
0)]([)])11(()~()()~([]
~),([ 11   
 UEqp
pdq
dqqp
pdq
dpqpUCov
qf
f
ff
d
d
ff
d
df  
or, )~()()~()]([
]~),([)11( 11
ff
d
d
ff
d
d
f
qf
f pdq
dqqp
pdq
dpq
UE
pUCov
qp  
  
     (8) 
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Since, the firm continues to equate domestic price to marginal cost of production in the 
domestic market, therefore, 0)( 1  qpd . So, equation (8) transforms to 
)~()]([
]~),([)11( 1
ff
d
d
f
qf
f pdq
dpq
UE
pUCov
qp 
  


  (9) 
The term on the left hand side is the expected marginal profit from selling in the foreign 
market. The right hand side includes a positive term, 0)~( ff
d
pdq
dp
, and a negative term, 
0]~),([  fpUCov  .  The necessary condition for positive marginal profit in the foreign 
market is: )~()]([
]~),([
ff
d
d
f
pdq
dpq
UE
pUCov 
 

 and the sufficient condition is that 
0)~( ff
d
pdq
dp
.  If the foreign quantity choice by the firm does in no way affect the 
domestic price, it will continue to sell positive amounts in both markets. It should further 
mean that the export price must ideally exceed the domestic price for positive 
participation in both markets.3 
However, if the price volatility goes down significantly in the foreign market, the 
marginal utility from profit rises there and the weight assigned by the risk-averse firm to 
the export market rises. It may lead to a positive economic profit at the margin and that 
the firm may continue to sell in both markets (with sales under competitive conditions in 
the domestic market). However, this is hardly ensured. Therefore, when we reformulate 
the above condition (equation 9, using 2), a positive difference may not exist between the 
foreign price (weighted by the elasticity of demand in the foreign market) and the 
                                                 
3
 Dalal and Katz (2003) show that a positive profit and positive sale in the export market are feasible even 
if the export price is lower than the domestic price (essentially if the marginal transport cost at home 
exceeds that for the foreign country).   
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domestic price, i.e.,      
)~()]([
]~),([)11(
ff
d
d
f
d
qf
f pdq
dpq
UE
pUCov
pp 
 

   (10) 
From (10), it is clearly not possible that the firm will sell a positive amount if the export 
price weighted by the demand elasticity is lower than the domestic price. For a given 
amount of output larger sale in the foreign market must raise the domestic price and vice 
versa. In case of the withdrawal of the quota under MFA it is possible that the foreign 
sale goes down for a firm leading to excess supply in the domestic market and a fall in 
price. This should allow the price difference to rise and beyond a critical level, where the 
firm is indifferent between domestic and foreign sales, it may fall. The converse may also 
hold, wherein the difference between the two prices is negative (a case where withdrawal 
of quota allows a large number of firms from an equally large number of countries) to 
supply in the previously regulated market, crashing the foreign price and raising the 
domestic price as a consequence. It might then lead to a „U-shaped‟ relation as the entry 
and exit of firms (and countries) respond heavily to price movements.  
Equation (9) therefore, suggests a possibility. Whether the firm continues to sell 
in both markets depends on whether the expected marginal profit from foreign sales 
exceeds that from the domestic sales. If 0])11([ 1   qp qff , then the firm 
continues to participate in both markets, since the condition for sale in the domestic 
market is based on the equality of marginal cost and price. The marginal expected profit 
in the foreign market exceeds that in the domestic market allowing the firm to sell in 
both.  But, more generally, 0])11([ 
 d
qf
f pp   does not ensure the distinct possibility 
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of multi-market activity by the firm, because the domestic price responds to how much 
the firm sells in the foreign market based on the expected foreign price. This result would 
not hold in the event of a quota, where regardless of the price impact, the firm cannot sell 
more (and for efficiency reason, less) to the export market.  
The withdrawal of MFA as an example is particularly revealing in this case. Since 
the effect of free entry and exit of countries (and firms) might make the international 
price more volatile or less, it should determine if the first terms on the right hand side of 
(9) dominates or the second term. In either case, this at least opens up the possibility of 
non-monotonic patterns in the export performance by such firms. The firm may either 
continue to export more if price becomes less volatile, or focus more on the domestic 
market if the price becomes more volatile. It might give rise to U-shaped or inverted U-
shaped export performance by the firm as measured over time.  
 
3. Evidence from Indian Textile and Apparel Manufacturers  
 The statistical observation follows from data selected over 15 years between 1991 
and 2013. The number of firms producing textile and apparel goes up to thirteen hundred, 
of which the number of purely exporting firms is actually negligible. Figure 1 shows that 
except for the year 2004, the number of firms that only cater to the export market has not 
gone up above 30. In terms of annual trend, the number of purely exporting firms was 
fairly small in the early years, reaching up to 30 in 1998, 32 in 2004 and falling steadily 
since then. In fact, after reaching a peak in 2004, the year when the final phase of the 
process of dismantling of MFA began globally, the number of firms involved in the 
business of exports only hovered around 20 till 2011. In recent years, the number has 
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gone down to just 5. Table 1 offers a descriptive statistics regarding the extent of total 
sales value, the domestic sales component and the revenue from export sales as well as 
the average percentage of export-to-total sales for approximately 415 firms that operate in 
both markets. The data accumulated over 13 years offer a large amount of data points, 
although admittedly, the group of firms is not the same for every year. The export-sale 
percentage is an average of all firms for a particular year and it shows that the mean of 
annual averages is approximately 34%.  
 The export revenue of the multi-market firms also shows an inverted U-shape 
analogous to the number of firms exclusively engaged with export. It seems that the 
analytical conjecture presented above holds in favor of more emphasis on the domestic 
market for the multi-market firm at the margin. The export as percentage of total sales 
went up from 20% in the early 1990s to 40% in 2003-04, right before the final phase of 
the abolition policy took shape. After 2004-05, the export proceeds as percentage of total 
sales goes down close to 30% and with a slight improvement in 2010-11 the share stays 
at 30% currently.  
 This is expected to impart certain readjustments at the domestic level, where we 
measured the concentration of firms according to the total sales reported every year. 
Since the firms vary in terms of size and sales capacity, it is quite possible that all firms 
will not be able to cope with the imminent pressure of international price meltdown 
subsequent to the withdrawal of export quota. This might lead to firms either losing 
business entirely or agglomerating with relatively larger ones in order to stay in business. 
With the help of the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), we showed that over most years 
the effects were not remarkable.           
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Values in million Rs)
Mean Std.Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Minimum Maximum NumCases
SALES-VALUE 2620.65 7546.81 12.0645 237.12 0.02 203105 5369
EXPRT-VALUE 733.203 1945.21 9.4432 160.783 0.1 46677.4 5456
DOM-SALE 1868.37 6249.4 12.0741 217.62 0.3 156427 5456
EXPORT-SALE 33.91 32.3903 0.726772 2.15836 0.05 126.876 5455
 
Data Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy – Prowess Database 
 
 
Figure 1. Number of Purely Exporting Firms
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Data Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy – Prowess Database 
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Figure 2. Export-Performance by Indian Textile Manufacturing Firms
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Data Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy – Prowess Database 
 
Figure 3. Year-Wise Concentration of Firms on the Basis of Total Sales (HHI)
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Figure 3 shows that the year-wise concentration of firms as per total sales went down 
since 1991 and stayed close to 1% for the entire decade of the 1990s. The concentration 
index doubled around 2007-08, but fell subsequently to the lowest level since the 
beginning of the data used for this analysis. However, from 2010 onwards, the rise has 
been remarkable and the level of concentration of firms has been close to three times the 
level in 2010. The price effects in the international market and its implications for the 
domestic market can be varied, and slow at the same time. The higher degree of 
concentration at the level of textile and apparel industry is probably suggestive of the fact 
that the smaller firms are finding it difficult to coexist with the bigger ones after the quota 
has been completely removed. One pertinent question is how did the smaller firms 
compete with the bigger ones even during the regime of quota protection? It is possible 
that the export quota allowed many firms to focus on the external markets while leaving 
the internal market to the disposal of small and medium-sized firms. However, in the 
event of removal of the quota, and the entry of China in the WTO has pushed many such 
firms to stiff competition from low-cost production from the Chinese industries. This 
might have influenced the erstwhile exporters and those with substantial interest in the 
foreign market alongside the domestic market, to depend more on the local sales. The 
consequent effect on price domestically have made small and medium-sized firms non-
competitive. Hence, over time the market share lies with a fewer firms compared to that 
in the previous decades. Note that, albeit we did not offer a rigorous empirical exercise to 
explain the exact degree by which the substitutability between foreign market and 
domestic market takes place, and identify the factors that significantly cause such 
reallocation, the descriptive analysis still suggest that the reallocation by firms operating 
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in multiple markets can be conditional. In some cases, it is equally feasible that the 
emphasis on the foreign market goes up despite a price or quantity shock facing the 
country or the firms.            
 The effect of MFA phase-out on countries that gained and lost can be largely 
explained by the competitiveness effect. Much in contradiction to the earlier belief that 
removal of quota shall lead to market expansion for all exporters, several exporting 
countries and firms therein have witnessed negative impact in the recent times. This holds 
true for the quinquennial and the annual results for most of the countries including India. 
On the other hand, that countries like Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia would suffer 
more in the face of competition from China and India turns out to be additional outcomes 
(see, Kar and Kar, 2011) of the drive towards freeing world trade from non-competitive 
barriers.   
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
This paper showed that when faced with uncertainty in certain markets vis-à-vis 
certainty of price in at least one of the markets facing a multi-market firm, the output and 
allocation decisions depend crucially on the standard comparison of marginal cost and 
price in the certain market. We used the separation result discussed in the beginning as an 
important instrument for this paper, in order to understand the implications of a quantity 
shock in the uncertain market on the price and sales reallocation in both certain and 
uncertain markets. To this end, we utilized the withdrawal of quota as a policy shock for 
the large textile and apparel industry worldwide with huge significance for a host of 
developing countries. The analytical section suggested that if the change in marginal 
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utility from profit (of a representative firm) owing to the change in the randomness of the 
foreign price outweighs the potential fall in price in case the firm focuses more on the 
domestic market, then the firm should continue to export a positive amount. The export 
share may even exceed the pre-withdrawal level. Conversely, if the withdrawal of quota 
and larger focus on the domestic market leads to a negative effect on the profit from 
foreign sales at the margin, then the firm is most likely to withdraw entirely from the 
foreign market and sale the full amount in the domestic market. Anywhere in between, 
the level of participation may go up or go down over time leading to possible U-shaped 
curves. We used some statistical observations from the firm level sales data for a large 
number of Indian firms dealing with textile and apparel. We did find that both the number 
of pure exporting firms as well as export as a share of the total sales display inverted U-
shaped relation between 1991 and 2013.  In fact, even though the slow phasing-out of 
MFA began way back in 1995, the number of pure exporting firms went up in the next 
ten years only to plummet to a very low level near the end of the series. It means that, 
while there has been widespread recognition of the fact that India did not fulfill the quota 
allotted to it even during the regime of protection, the quota still offered substantial 
protection to firms for exploring the foreign market. The withdrawal of the quota has in 
turn reduced both participation and sale in such markets. In addition, it may have 
rendered small and medium-sized firms unviable in the local market leading to greater 
market concentration for this industry.         
A host of other issues, including the impact of textile industry on general growth and 
welfare levels should in future help to understand the broader reach of the trade policy 
dealt with in this chapter.  Similarly, it would be interesting to investigate the 
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implications of MFA withdrawal on the labor market in further detail and discuss 
relevant policy aspects.     
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